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When Public Employees Speak Out on Issues of Public
Concern: The Applicability of Pickering in Garcetti v.
Ceballos
By Jayne Chen*
I. INTRODUCTION
A government lawyer writes a memo and meets with his
supervisors, recommending the dismissal of a case due to a flawed
search warrant.' After his supervisors disagree and proceed with the
case despite the lawyer's concerns, he is called by the defense to
testify regarding his memo.2  Shortly thereafter, the lawyer is
reassigned and transferred to another office. 3
Is this a justifiable action brought on by such unexciting
circumstances as changing staffing needs? 4 Or is this a retaliatory
action for speaking up about a work-related matter?5 A government
employer's inexcusable response to a citizen speaking out on a matter
of public concern? 6 Or, worse yet, is it both?7
When public employees make statements pursuant to their
official duties, may their speech be protected from employer
* J.D. candidate, 2008, Pepperdine University School of Law. B.A., 2001,
Harvard University. Thanks to Professor Ogden, who suggested this case to
Journal members as a possible paper topic. In addition, thanks to Christina Royce
for her encouragement and advice.
1. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 1955 (2006).
2. Id. at 1956.
3. Id
4. Id
5. Id.
6. Id
7. Id. at 1963.
discipline by the First Amendment? The Supreme Court addressed
this question in Garcetti v. Ceballos, and held that: (1) when public
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, they are
not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes; 8 and (2) the
Constitution does not protect their communications from employer
discipline.9  Further, the Court held that Richard Ceballos, the
government lawyer, did not speak as a citizen when he wrote his
memo, thus his speech was not protected by the First Amendment. 10
Garcetti v. Ceballos is the latest in a series of Supreme Court
decisions addressing the heavily debated area of First Amendment
protection for government employees. At the heart of this debate is
an intersection between the importance of speaking out on issues of
public concern and the Constitutional limitations of public
employment. 11  The area of First Amendment protection for
government employee speech is broad and can encompass countless
permutations and outcomes based on the various types of speech,
speakers, and circumstances involved. In Garcetti, the Court
specifically addresses the notion that public employees that speak
about matters pursuant to their official duties are not entitled to full
First Amendment protection of their speech. ' 2
The purpose of this note is to address the Garcetti decision and its
implications. Part II reviews the history of the Court's decisions
regarding First Amendment protection for public employee speech,
and the different outcomes depending on various factors; Part III
summarizes the facts of Garcetti; Part IV reviews and analyzes
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, as well as the dissenting
opinions of Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer; Part V discusses
both the legal and societal impact of the Garcetti decision; and Part
VI concludes the note.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
At issue in Garcetti is the subject of First Amendment protection
8. Id. at 1962.
9. Id. at 1960.
10. Id
11. See id. at 1951.
12. See id.
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for speech made pursuant to an employee's official duties. To
understand how speech from an employee can affect a citizen's First
Amendment rights, we must first look to the relevant historical
development of free speech issues for employees, and more
specifically, for government employees.
The First Amendment provides that: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances."' 13 However, courts have
long debated whether and to what extent the First Amendment
protects government attorneys from disciplinary actions because of
their speech. 14
As the spectrum of free speech cases regarding public employees
is far reaching, there are numerous cases regarding employee speech
and defamation. 5 Although false statements are not at issue in
Garcetti, past cases regarding defamation raise concepts relevant to
Garcetti.16 In particular, cases such as Garrison v. Louisiana address
the scope of First Amendment protection for speech regarding
matters of public concern. 17
In Garrison, the Court held that statements made by public
officials regarding issues of public concern are protectable under the
First Amendment. 18 In that case, Jim Garrison, a district attorney of
Orleans Parish, Louisiana, had a dispute with eight criminal district
court judges over funds used to help defray the District Attorney's
office expenses.' 9  Garrison held a press conference, where he
13. U.S. Const. amend. I.
14. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1973.
15. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
16. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1955. In Garcetti, petitioners never asserted that
Ceballos made false statements in his memo regarding alleged misrepresentations
made in the search warrant at issue. See generally id. at 1951, 1955.
17. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 65 (1964).
18. Id. at 77.
19. Id. Garrison's allegedly defamatory statements attributed the inefficiency
of the court system to the judges' inefficiency, laziness, and excessive vacationing,
among other claims. Id. at 66.
criticized the judges' judicial conduct.2" As a result, Garrison was
convicted of criminal defamation under the Louisiana Criminal
Defamation Statute.2'
The Garrison Court held that the Louisiana statute was
constitutionally invalid regarding criticism of official conduct of
public officials.22 Incorrectly applying New York Times v. Sullivan,23
the Louisiana statute punished those who made false statements
criticizing public officials' official conduct, regardless of whether
there was actual malice.24
Under Garrison, any criticism that touches upon a public
official's reputation is relevant.25  The Garrison Court held that
statements made by public officials on matters of public concern
must be afforded First Amendment protection even though the
statements are directed at their nominal superiors. 26
In the late 1960s, the Court created a balancing test to be
implemented when evaluating First Amendment claims by public
employees. In 1968, the Court in Pickering v. Board of Education
held that there must be a balancing of both the individual's interests
and the public's interests.27  In Pickering, Marvin Pickering, a
teacher in Township High School District of Will County, Illinois,
was fired for sending a letter to a local newspaper regarding a
proposed tax increase that was critical of the way the school board
had handled such proposals in the past.28 The Board dismissed
Pickering for writing and publishing the letter, from which Pickering
20. Id. at 65.
21. Id. at 66.
22. Id. at 77.
23. Sullivan held that unless there is a false statement made with actual
malice, a public official may not receive damages in a civil action for criticism of
his official conduct. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
24. Garrison, at 77; see N. Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. 254.
25. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 77.
26. Id. at 64.
27. Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
28. Id. at 564. The Board of Education asked the school district to approve a
bond issue to raise money to build two new schools, and to that end later proposed
an increase in the tax rate. Id. at 565. Pickering's letter addressed what he felt was
the School Board's mishandling of the bond issue proposals as well as the school
superintendent's alleged attempt to prevent teachers from speaking out against the
issue. Id. at 566.
Fall 2007 When Public Employees Speak Out
646 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 27-2
claimed the Board violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.29
The Pickering Court contended that a public employee does not
give up his First Amendment right to comment on matters of public
concern simply because he is employed by the government.30
However, the Court conceded that the state's interests as an employer
in regulating the speech of its employees "differ significantly from
those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the
citizenry in general."'"
Also, the statements at issue in Pickering were in no way directed
towards anyone Pickering would normally interact with on a daily
basis as a school teacher. 32 Further, Pickering's letter was written
after the second tax increase proposal failed, thus it had no effect on
the school district's ability to raise the necessary funds for the
schools. 33  The Pickering Court found that the letter addressed a
matter of legitimate public concern regarding the local school
system. 34
The fact that Pickering's employment by the school district is
only tangentially related to the essence of his letter, the Pickering
Court concluded Pickering must be regarded as a citizen, and not an
employee, for the purposes of assessing his speech.35 Ultimately, the
Court held that Pickering's right to speak on issues of public
importance and the fact the letter was critical of the board's past
actions could not serve as a basis for firing him.36
29. Pickering v. Board of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 566-67 (1968). The Board of
Education concluded that numerous statements in Pickering's letter were false, and
that the publication of the statements unjustifiably impugned the motives and
honesty of both the Board and the school administration. Id. at 567.
30. Id. at 568.
31. Id
32. Id. at 569-70. In fact, the Pickering Court writes that Pickering's
relationships with the Board and the superintendent were not the type where
personal loyalty is required as it would be in other public employment jobs. Id. at
570. However, the school board and superintendent could be construed as
Pickering's ultimate employer. Id. at 572.
33. Id. at 571.
34. Id
35. Id. at 574.
36. Id. at 575.
In Pickering, the Court sought to balance the teacher's interests
as a citizen in commenting on matters of public concern, with the
state's interests as an employer in efficiently performing its public
services.37 Thus, Pickering established that a court must first
determine whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of
public concern to then determine whether or not there is a potential
First Amendment claim.38
The result of Pickering is that it framed the issue of First
Amendment rights of public employees as a balancing act between
seemingly competing issues. Since Pickering, courts have applied its
balancing test in cases dealing with public employees who allege that
their First Amendment rights have been violated through retaliatory
actions.
Since the Pickering decision in 1968, the Court has continued to
explore the balance between the interests of the individual and the
employer, and the various situations in which an employee's First
Amendment rights may or may not be recognized.
In 1973, the California Court of Appeal explored one such
situation in which a public employee's interests were outweighed by
that of the employer's. 39 In Johnson v. County of Santa Clara, the
court held that a probation officer who wrote and posted a poem
expressing his dissatisfaction at being transferred was not entitled to
full First Amendment protection.n
37. Id. at 568. According to the Pickering Court, the threat of dismissal from
public employment is an effective means of inhibiting speech. Id. at 574.
38. Id. According to Pickering, teachers were deemed a class of community
members likely to have informed opinions on how school funds should be spent.
Id. at 572.
39. Johnson v. County of Santa Clara, 31 Cal. App. 3d 26 (1973).
40. Id. The county superintendent of probation services transferred Philip
Johnson, deputy county probation officer, to the adult probation department as part
of its general policy to provide employees with a variety of professional
opportunities. Id. at 28. Upon being told of the transfer, Johnson wrote a poem
expressing his dissatisfaction about the transfer, and described a bomb blowing his
supervisor out of his window. Id. at 29. Johnson showed the poem to a few of his
friends in the office, as well as to his immediate supervisor. Id.
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As a direct result of writing the poem, Johnson was temporarily
suspended and transferred to a different unit.4 1 The court in Johnson
felt that the poem indicated Johnson's insubordinate attitude, and that
the reference to a bomb indicated an intention to take some sort of
strong action against his supervisor.42 Thus, the court held that the
poem's expression harmed the public service and was not entitled to
absolute First Amendment protection.43
Under Johnson, a government agency seeking to restrict an
employee's exercise of his constitutional rights must show: "(1) the
governmental restraint rationally relates to the enhancement of the
public service; (2) the benefits that the public gains by this restraint
outweigh the resulting impairment of the constitutional right; and (3)
no alternatives less subversive to the constitutional right are
available., 44 The court distinguished Johnson from Pickering stating
that, unlike the expression in Johnson, the teacher's letter in
Pickering did not demonstrate an attitude of non-cooperation.45
Whereas Johnson determined a situation in which a public
employee's right to speak out against his employer was outweighed
by his employer's interests, Madison Joint School District v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission determined that a
public employee could speak out, not only as an employee, but as a
citizen on important public issues.46 In 1976, Madison centered
around a public discussion which turned into a pending labor
negotiation between the board and the teachers' union during an open
Board of Education meeting.47 Over the union's objection, a
nonunion teacher addressed an aspect of the pending negotiations. 48
41. Id. at 30. As a result of writing the poem, Johnson was suspended without
pay for one month and transferred to the adult probation department. Id. There
was no dispute that Johnson was disciplined because he wrote the poem. Id. at 31.
42. Id. at 33-34. The court felt that Johnson's supervisor was justified in
deeming the poem an overly emotional reaction to a routine transfer. Id. at 34.
43. Id.
44. Id at 31.
45. Id
46. City of Madison, Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
47. Id. at 170-71.
48. Id. In his speech at the school board meeting, the teacher stated he
represented an informal committee of 72 teachers in 49 schools. Id. at 171. The
In Madison, the teachers' union sued the school board for
violating a Wisconsin statute by committing a prohibited labor
practice of engaging in negotiations with someone other than the
designated exclusive collective-bargaining representative. 49  The
Madison Court held that the First Amendment required that a school
teacher be permitted to speak at a public school board meeting
despite the board's contention that doing so violated Wisconsin
statute.50 Under the holding in Madison, when the board conducts
public meetings to seek public opinion regarding issues such as their
pending negotiations, it may not be required to categorize speakers
based on their employment or the content of their speech.5
The Madison Court held that a teacher could not be
constitutionally prohibited from speaking at the meeting where public
participation was permitted.52 According to Madison, because the
board meeting was open to the public, the nonunion teacher spoke
out as both an employee and as a concerned citizen on an important
public issue.53
Like Johnson and Madison, cases following Pickering continued
to explore the delicate balance between employer and employee
interests. In Hosford v. California State Personnel Board, Horace
Hosford was fired from the highway patrol for willful disobedience
teacher discussed the union's demand for a "fair share" clause, which would require
all teachers (regardless of whether they were union members or not) to pay union
dues. Id. He read a petition signed by the teachers in the district, which called for
postponement of the issue. Id. Afterwards, a collective-bargaining agreement
without the "fair share" clause was signed, and the union sued the board. Id.
49. Id. at 172.
50. Id. at 175.
51. Id. at 176.
52. Id. at 175.
53. Id. at 174-75. Under Madison, the teacher was not speaking solely as a
citizen because the teacher stated that he represented an informal committee of
teachers, he spoke before the school board as both as an employee and a citizen
exercising his First Amendment rights. Id. at 171, 177. The Court noted that in
Madison, almost all speech regarding the way the school system operates could
also be characterized as relating to collective bargaining. Id at 177. The Madison
Court further noted that teachers comprise the core and majority of the school
system, thus to restrict their freedom of speech regarding the operation of the
school system would severely impair the school board's ability to manage the
district. Id.
Fall 2007 When Public Employees Speak Out
650 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 27-2
and repeated disrespect towards his supervisor, among other things.54
Hosford sued to overturn his termination alleging a violation of his
First Amendment rights.55 The California Court of Appeal upheld
his dismissal finding that the highway patrol's interests in
maintaining morale and discipline far outweighed Hosford's right to
unfettered speech during work.56
The court rejected Hosford's contention that the punishment
violated his First Amendment rights, and in fact, found that the
Highway Patrol's interest in maintaining morale and discipline far
outweighed the member's interest in exercising an unfettered right of
speech in the course of duty.57 According to the court, dismissal as a
punishment was not an abuse of discretion.58
In addition to the balancing of employer and employee interests,
the court began to establish the various circumstances which could
ultimately affect the application and outcome of the Pickering
balancing test. In Givhan v. Western Line Consolidate School
District, for example, the Court held that First Amendment protection
still applies when a public employee arranges to communicate
privately with his employer rather than express his views publicly.59
Bessie Givhan was a junior high school teacher who filed a
complaint in intervention in the desegregation order of her school,
and claimed she was terminated in violation of her First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights for criticizing the policies and
practices of her school district.60 Among the speech at issue was a
54. Hosford v. Cal. State Pers. Bd., 74 Cal. App. 3d 302 (1977). Horace
Hosford worked for the highway patrol. Id. at 305. The Personnel Board found he
was guilty of inefficiency, neglect of duty, insubordination, and willful
disobedience because he was chronically absent, and showed repeated disrespect to
his immediate supervisor. Hosford was subsequently fired. Id.
55. Id. at 306.
56. Id. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court denial of Hosford's
petition for writ of mandamus to overturn the Personnel Board's decision to uphold
his dismissal from the patrol. Id. at 305-06.
57. Id. at 306.
58. Id. at 313.
59. Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
60. Id. at 412.
series of private interactions between Givhan and the school principal
where Givhan allegedly made unreasonable demands. 61
The Fifth Circuit held that her criticism of the school's
desegregation efforts was not protected, holding that there is no
constitutional right to impose one's ideas on another.62 However, the
Court in Givhan held, in line with Pickering, that a public employee
does not give up his First Amendment rights when he chooses to
express his views in a private instead of in a public forum. 6 3
In referring to Pickering, the Givhan Court noted that balancing
public and private interests involve different considerations
depending on the context. 64 Under Givhan, private expression, such
as a government employee confronting his supervisor in private, may
threaten the employer's institutional efficiency not only by the
content of the employee's speech but also by its manner, time, and
place. 65
In addition to the various circumstances which can affect a
Pickering analysis, the Givhan Court examined the content of the
speech at issue. In Connick v. Myers the Court held that a public
employee's speech on a matter of purely private concern is not
protected by the First Amendment.66
Under Connick, a public employee's speech is potentially
protected only if it is a matter of public concern.67 The Connick
Court applied Pickering and determined that whether an employee's
speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by
the content, form, and context of a given statement.68 In Connick,
Sheila Myers, a former assistant district attorney, was informed she
would be transferred to a different section of her department.69 Upon
61. Id. at412-13.
62. Id. at413.
63. Id. at 414.
64. Id. at 415.
65. Id. at 415 n.4.
66. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983).
67. Id
68. Id.
69. Id. at 140. Myers was employed by petitioner Harry Connick. Id.
Although she performed her responsibilities competently, in October of 1980,
Myers was told she was being transferred to a different section. Id. Myers strongly
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expressing her opposition to the transfer, Myers prepared and
distributed a workplace questionnaire regarding internal office affairs
and was subsequently fired.7 °
Myers filed a section 1983 claim alleging that she was terminated
because she exercised her First Amendment right to free speech.7 '
The Supreme Court in Connick held that the lower courts misapplied
Pickering, and that terminating Myers did not violate her First
Amendment rights.
72
According to the Connick Court, in applying Pickering, the lower
court wrongly characterized the subject matter of Myers'
questionnaire as a matter of public concern, when instead it dealt
with internal office matters only. 73 The Connick Court noted that
because Myers' questionnaire could not be fairly characterized as
speech regarding public concern, the Court did not need to initiate a
First Amendment inquiry into why she was fired.74 At the same time,
Connick does not go so far as to suggest that speech on private
matters be treated the same across the board.75
opposed this, expressed her view to several of her superiors, including Connick, but
was transferred anyway. Id.
70. Id. at 141. Myers prepared a questionnaire soliciting the views of her
fellow staff members regarding office transfer policy, office morale, need for a
grievance committee, level of confidence in the supervisors, and whether
employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns; she distributed it to fifteen
assistant district attorneys. Id. When Dennis Waldron, an assistant district
attorney, learned Myers was passing out the survey, he told Connick that Myers
was creating a "mini-insurrection" in the office. Id. at 141. Myers was told that
distributing the questionnaire was an act of insubordination. Id.
71. Id. at 140-41. Connick fired Myers and told her she was being terminated
because she refused to accept the transfer. Id. at 142. However, the Connick Court
asserts that the facts showed the real reason for being fired was the questionnaire.
Id.
72. Id. at 142.
73. Id
74. Id. at 146-47. Justice White noted: "When employee expression cannot be
fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to
the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their
offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First
Amendment." Id. The Connick Court also acknowledged that regular dismissals
from government service are not subject to judicial review, even if they are
allegedly unreasonable or mistaken. Id. at 147-48.
75. Id. at 147.
Instead, Connick established that in determining whether an
employee's speech deals with a matter of public or private concern
the Court must look at the content, form and context.76 In Myers'
case, the Court found her questionnaire overwhelmingly addressed
her own private concerns of office morale and her own complaint
regarding being transferred to another division.77
However, the Connick Court acknowledged that one question in
Myers' questionnaire-whether an employee ever felt pressure to
work in political campaigns of office-supported candidates-
reflected an ancillary issue of employers coercing particular beliefs
on their employees in violation of the Constitution, which would then
become a matter of public concern. 78  In such situations, public
employees facing such coercion must be able to speak out freely
without the threat of retaliatory discharge.79
According to Connick, not all expressions of speech that take
place in a government employment setting are matters of public
concern. 80 Unlike the letter to the newspaper in Pickering, Myers'
questionnaire impacted her close working relationship. Under
Connick, when such close working relationships are necessary to
fulfill official duties, there is a wide discretion of deference to the
employer's judgment. 81
In Myers' case, where, when, and how her speech was expressed
presented additional factors to the Connick Court when balancing
various interests. They considered the fact that Myers' questionnaire
was prepared and distributed at the office, and the fact that she wrote
the questionnaire, not out of academic interest, but in response to
receiving word of her transfer both supported the notion that her
expression was disruptive to the office and threatened her employer's
76. Idat 147-48.
77. Id. at 148. The Connick Court points out that Myers' questionnaire did
not bring to light any actual wrongdoing or seek to tell the public about some
substantive aspect of her employer's responsibilities. Id. There was no
demonstration that the questionnaire impeded Myer's ability to perform her
responsibilities. Id. at 151.
78. Id. at 149.
79. Id.
80. Id
81. Id. at 151-52. In her supervisors' eyes, Myers' questionnaire was an act of
insubordination, and thus evidently disruptive to the office environment. Id. at 151.
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attempt to maintain authority and efficiency in the workplace.
82
Thus, while Myers' questionnaire dealt briefly with a public concern,
on balance, the Connick Court found her speech to be of a private
concern.
83
The Circuits have also applied the Pickering balancing test to
weigh in on First Amendment protection of employee speech. In
Giacalone v. Abrams, the Second Circuit held that a state government
attorney was not entitled to First Amendment protection against
discipline because of speech that included communications with
superiors. 84 In 1982, Arthur Giacalone, an assistant attorney general
in Buffalo, New York, was assigned to a matter involving two
corporations who failed to pay their employees in conformance with
New York Law.85
After Giacalone negotiated a settlement agreement where the
corporations would pay back wages, a dispute arose over his
department's failure to withhold income taxes exposing the unpaid
employees to liability.86 When Giacalone disapproved of the action
his department took, he wrote a memo expressing so, and submitted
it to upper management. 87 After discussing the memo with his
supervisor, Giacalone wrote another memo addressing the issue.
Subsequently, his department decided to terminate Giacalone's
employment.88
In Giacalone, the court concluded that it was not clearly
established that firing Giacalone violated his First Amendment
rights. 89  According to the court in Giacalone, the Pickering
balancing test and its successors would likely have revealed to
82. Id. at 153.
83. Id. at 154.
84. Giacalone v. Abrams, 850 F.2d. 79 (1988); see also Lefcourt v. Legal Aid
Soc., 445 F.2d 1150 (1971); Steinberg v. Thomas, 659 F. Supp. 789 (1987).
85. Giacalone, 850 F.2d at 81.
86. Id. After Giacalone drafted a memo recommending payment be delayed,
his supervisors wanted to keep the tax dispute under wraps until after the election
of their department head, the Attorney General. Id. at 82.
87. Id. at 82.
88. Id. at 83.
89. Id. at 88.
Giacalone's supervisors that his First Amendment interest was
outweighed by the disruption his speech created. 90
The Ninth Circuit has found employee speech regarding public
concern to be constitutionally protected in certain circumstances. In
Roth v. Veteran's Administration, Barry Roth, a physician at the
Veterans Administration ("VA") Medical Center, was fired after
reporting to his superiors his criticisms of his job and workplace.9 1
Among his contentions, Roth complained that the VA wasted
resources, violated safety regulations, and acted unethically.92 As
such, the Ninth Circuit in Roth held that Roth's speech regarded a
matter of public concern and was thus constitutionally protected.93
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit looked at the context of Roth's
statements in finding his speech was constitutionally protected. 94
Roth's criticisms of his workplace were not in response to his
termination, demotion, or transfer.95 Instead, Roth was specifically
hired as a troubleshooter, whose job obliged him to make such
evaluations of his department.96 The Ninth Circuit then discounted
any disruptive effect of Roth's comments partially because his
supervisors' failure to support Roth in instituting the necessary
reforms likely worsened any disruption. Secondly, whistleblowing,
by its very nature, will cause commotion, at the very least, in the
workplace. 97
While Pickering established the broad basis of balancing the
interests of a public employee and employer when evaluating the
employee's First Amendment rights, its predecessors have continued
90. Id. at 88.
91. Roth v. Veterans Admin., 856 F.2d 1401 (1988). Roth sued various
Veterans Administration officials for First and Fifth Amendment violations. Id. at
1403. Roth was hired as a trouble shooter, where Veterans Administration officials
told him he could undertake necessary steps to fulfill his duties and he did so. Id.
92. Id. at 1406.
93. Id. The Ninth Circuit distinguished Roth from Connick by contrasting
Roth's complaint of safety and ethical violations with Myers' questions regarding
office morale. Id.
94. Id
95. Id
96. Id
97. Id. at 1407.
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to flesh out the various situations and circumstances that can affect
such an analysis.
In Madison, the Court determined that a public employee could
speak, not only as an employee, but also as a citizen on important
public issues.98  In Hosford, the California court found a public
employee's right to engage in repeated disrespectful and disobedient
speech at work was outweighed by his employer's interest in
maintaining morale and discipline. 99 In Givhan, the Court noted that
a Pickering analysis must take into consideration various
circumstances such as the content and context of a given statement,
holding that First Amendment protection still applies when a public
employee arranges to communicate privately with his employer
rather than express his views publicly.l 0 As in Givhan, the Court in
Connick held that a public employee's speech on a matter of purely
private concern is not protected by the First Amendment.'0 1
III. FACTS
Starting in 1989, Richard Ceballos was a deputy district attorney
for the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office.'0 2  In
February 2000, a defense attorney contacted Ceballos about a
pending criminal case, saying that there were inaccuracies in an
affidavit used to obtain a critical search warrant, and he wanted
Ceballos to review the case.10 3 Ceballos determined that the affidavit
had serious misrepresentations.10 4
On March 2, 2000, Ceballos reported his findings and submitted a
memo recommending the case's dismissal to his supervisors,
98. Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n , 429
U.S. 167 (1976).
99. Hosford v. Cal. State Pers. Bd., 74 Cal. App. 3d 302, 306 (1977). The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court denial of Hosford's petition for writ of
mandamus to overturn the Personnel Board's decision to uphold his dismissal from
the patrol. Id. at 305, 306.
100. Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415 (1979).
101. Id. at 147-48.
102. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1955 (2006).
103. Id. at 1955
104. Id. An example of one of the serious misrepresentations was that the
affidavit referred to a separate roadway as a "long driveway." Id.
27-2
petitioners Carol Najera and Frank Sundstedt.'05 After a meeting was
held (with Ceballos, Najera, Sundstedt, and others) to discuss the
affidavit in question, Sundstedt decided to proceed with the
prosecution anyway.'0 6  The trial court held a hearing on the
defense's motion to traverse, and Ceballos was called by the defense
to recount the observations he made in the affidavit. °7
Ceballos claimed that, after these events, he was subjected to a
series of retaliatory employment actions including: reassignment to a
trial deputy position, transfer to another courthouse, and denial of a
promotion. 1
0 8
First, Ceballos initiated an employment grievance. 10 9 Ceballos'
supervisors denied his grievance asserting Ceballos did not suffer any
retaliation." 0 Second, he filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in district
court, claiming the county and his supervisors at the District
Attorney's office, including Najera and Sundstedt, violated his First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights."' In particular, Ceballos alleged
he was subject to adverse employment actions in retaliation for
writing a memo where he recommended the dismissal of a case on
the basis of government misconduct."12
In response, petitioners said they did not take retaliatory actions
and that their actions at issue were legitimate due to reasons such as
staffing needs. 1 13 Further, the petitioners claimed the memo was not
protected under the First Amendment and moved for summary
judgment.' 14 The United States District Court granted the
petitioners' motion for summary judgment, finding Ceballos wrote
105. Id. at 1955-56.
106. Id. at 1956.
107. Id.
108. Id
109. Id.
110. Id
111. Id. at 1955-56.
112. Id. at 1955. Ceballos was a calendar deputy in the office's Pomona
branch, where he exercised certain supervisory responsibilities over other lawyers.
Id.
113. Id. at 1956.
114. Id
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his memo pursuant to his employment duties; thus, was not entitled
to First Amendment protection for the memo's contents. 
15
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case. 1 6 The court
held that the allegations of wrongdoing contained in Ceballos'
memorandum constituted protected speech for the purposes of the
First Amendment." 17  In particular, the Ninth Circuit relied on
circuit precedent and looked to several prior cases involving free
speech and public concerns including Pickering v. Board of
Education and Connick v. United States.118
The Ninth Circuit held that Ceballos' memo was inherently a
matter of public concern.1 9 However, it did not consider whether the
speech was made in Ceballos' capacity as a citizen. 120 Using the
Pickering balancing approach, the Ninth Circuit weighed Ceballos'
interest in his speech against his supervisors' interest in responding to
his memo.12' The Ninth Circuit ultimately found in Ceballos' favor,
contending that Petitioners "failed even to suggest disruption or
inefficiency in the workings of the District Attorney's Office" as a
result of the memo. 122
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, and held
that, when making statements pursuant to their official duties, public
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment
purposes.' 23 The Court also held that the Constitution does not
protect public employees' communications from employer
115. Id. at 1956.
116. Id
117. Id
118. Id. In Connick, the Court instructs courts to first consider "whether the
expressions in question were made by the speaker 'as a citizen upon matters of
public concern' Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-147 (1983).
119. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1956.
120. Id
121. Id. at 1957; see id. at 1180.
122. Id. Judge O'Scannlain specially concurred, saying that the court was
compelled by Circuit precedent and emphasized the difference between speech
offered by a public employee acting as an employee and acting as a citizen. Id. at
1185. "When public employees speak in the course of carrying out their routine,
required employment obligations, they have no personal interest in the content of
that speech that gives rise to a First Amendment right." Id. at 1189.
123. Id. at 1962.
discipline.'24 Further, the Court found that Ceballos did not speak as
a citizen when he wrote his memo, thus his speech was not protected
by the First Amendment.' 2 5
IV.ANALYSIS
A. Majority Opinion: Justice Kennedy
In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy holds that the Pickering
balancing test does not apply in Garcetti, and that statements made
by public employees pursuant to their official duties are not subject
to First Amendment protection. 126 First, Justice Kennedy holds that
there is a general notion that a public employee has no grounds to
object to constitutional restrictions that may be placed on the job. 127
However, Justice Kennedy acknowledges there are numerous
qualifications to that notion. 28 In particular, and most relevant to
Garcetti, the First Amendment protects a public employee's right, in
certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of
public concern.129
In assessing the instances where a public employee's speech may
be protected, Justice Kennedy first addresses the effect and
implications of Pickering and its balancing approach. 30  In
124. Id. at 1960.
125. Id. at 1961.
126. Id. at 1958.
127. Id. at 1957. The Connick Court states that, "the unchallenged dogma was
that a public employee had no right to object to conditions placed upon the terms of
employment-including those which restricted the exercise of constitutional
rights." Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983).
128. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1957.
129. Id
130. Id. In Pickering, the Court had to decide if a school teacher's letter to a
local newspaper, addressing issues such as funding policies of the school board,
was protected by the First Amendment or not. Pickering v. Board of Ed., 391 U.S.
563, 567-68 (1968). The Pickering Court sought to balance the interests of the
school teacher as a citizen and the interests of the state as an employer. Id. at 568.
The Court found that the teacher's speech did not impede the teacher's proper
performance of his daily duties, thus the school administration's interest in limiting
teachers' chances to contribute to public debate was not significantly greater than
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determining whether there is constitutional protection for a public
employee's speech, Justice Kennedy asserts that a Pickering analysis
asks two main questions.
First, the court must ask whether or not an employee spoke as a
citizen on a matter of public concern. 3 ' If not, the employee has no
First Amendment cause of action. 32 If so, there is a possibility of a
First Amendment claim.' 33 Second, the court must ask whether the
relevant government entity has an adequate justification for treating
the employee differently from any other member of the general
public. 134
Seeming to find the answer to the first Pickering question to be
no-that Ceballos did not speak as a citizen on a matter of public
concern-Justice Kennedy determines that when public employees
make statements pursuant to their official duties, they are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes.'35 As such, the
its interest in limiting any similar contribution by any member of the general
public." Id. at 573.
131. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1958; see Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
132. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1958, see Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
133. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
134. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1958, see Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. According
to Justice Kennedy in Garcetti, this second question emphasizes importance of
relationship between speaker's expressions and employment. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct.
at 1958.
135. Id. Justice Kennedy's rationalization for finding Ceballos' speech to be
unprotected seems to rest squarely on his assumption that Ceballos did not speak as
a citizen on a matter of public concern. Id. According to Professor Martin
Schwartz, Garcetti effectively created a new dichotomy between "an employee's
speech that is part of the employee's official duties, which is never protected
speech, and speech in the employee's capacity as a private citizen which, if a matter
of public concern, may be protected." Martin A. Schwartz, Supreme Court Review:
October 2005 Term, Section 1983 and Other Civil Rights Cases, at 14. In creating
a new dichotomy, Justice Kennedy appears to overlook speech that is part of an
employee's official duties which also happen to be matters of public concern. Id.
In contrast, prior cases such as Givhan and Connick acknowledged that specific
circumstances, such as context, time, place, and manner, can affect the analysis of
providing First Amendment protection. See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist.,
439 U.S. 410, 415 (1979); Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48. Further, Justice
Kennedy's resounding belief that public employees who speak out pursuant to their
job duties may not also speak out as citizens concerned about public matters
preclude a balancing of various interests from even occurring by foreclosing
Pickering from applying to such cases.
Constitution does not protect their communications from employer
discipline.136 Justice Kennedy further contends that, when a citizen
becomes a government employee, because of the very nature of the
work, the citizen must accept that certain limitations on his freedom
come with the job, such as a restriction on his First Amendment
rights. 137
In reaching his conclusion, Justice Kennedy evaluates the facts of
Garcetti.138 First, Justice Kennedy dismisses the factors he didn't
find to be dispositive in his analysis; the fact Ceballos expressed his
views (that the affidavit had serious misrepresentations) inside his
office (instead of publicly); 139 and the fact that the memo concerned
the subject matter of Ceballos' employment.140
136. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1958. Justice Kennedy seems to imply that,
because one works for the government, he has a heightened duty of responsibility.
Later, Justice Kennedy comments that there is an established precedent of giving
government employers discretion to efficiently and effectively manage their
employees. Id. at 1960. However, along that logic, there seems to be no reason for
any elevated status for a government employer as compared to a non-government
employer. The goals of efficiency and effectuating an employer's particular
policies and targets seems universal, and not just limited to government work.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1959.
139. Id. Justice Kennedy notes that, in some cases, employees may receive
First Amendment protection for expressions made at work. Id. In Givhan, a school
teacher voiced her concerns against desegregation in private conversations with her
supervisor. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 412-13. The Givhan Court held that First
Amendment protection still applies when a public employee arranges to
communicate privately with his employer rather than express his views publicly.
Id. at 410. Had Ceballos voiced his concerns in a public forum, say at a town hall
meeting, Justice Kennedy may have had to give this fact more consideration.
Further, Justice Kennedy appears to quickly dismiss the apparent benefit to the
District Attorney's office from Ceballos disseminated his memo privately instead
of holding a press conference or the like. Justice Kennedy later discusses the
importance a government employer establishing managerial efficiency and protocol
for handling inter-office communication. Garcetti, 126 U.S. at 1960. Clearly,
Ceballos chose the arguably more respectful avenue of handling his complaints of
the allegedly faulty search warrant internally. For Justice Kennedy to conclude this
fact is not dispositive seems strange in light of his previous and subsequent
comments.
140. Garcetti, 126 U.S. at 1959. Justice Kennedy does not elaborate on why
the fact Ceballos' memo related to the subject matter of his employment does not
weigh for or against a finding of First Amendment protection. However, Justice
Kennedy acknowledges that some expressions related to an employee's job may be
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Instead, Justice Kennedy asserts that the pivotal factor in denying
Ceballos' memo constitutional protection is that Ceballos'
recommendations to his supervisors were made pursuant to his duties
as a calendar deputy.14 1  Justice Kennedy contends that restricting
speech made solely as a result of one's employment does not infringe
on any Constitutional rights an employee might e-njoy as a private
citizen, but instead displays the employer's control over its
workplace. 142
To support this notion, Justice Kennedy cites the assessment of
Rust v. Sullivan in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University
of Virginia saying that "[w]hen the government appropriates public
funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say
what it wishes.' ' 143 Justice Kennedy argues that Ceballos wrote his
disposition memo because that was part of his employment duties."'
protected, as was the case in Givhan and Pickering. Id.; see generally Givhan, 439
U.S. at 415-16; Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1968). In
Pickering, a school teacher wrote a letter to his local newspaper regarding the
school board's funding of local schools, and the Court held that teachers are
deemed a class in a community who would most likely have informed opinions as
to how the funds should be spent. Id. at 572. In doing so, the Pickering Court
found that the teacher spoke as a citizen regarding a public concern. Id. Similarly,
one could argue that Ceballos, as an educated deputy district attorney devoted to
public service, would be in the best position to know if a search warrant in a
pending investigation was faulty or not. Admittedly, only those involved with the
case and search warrant at issue would have an adequate basis to speak out about
the matter. However, it would not seem remotely far-fetched for the Garcetti court
to find that Ceballos spoke as both an employee and a citizen regarding a public
concern.
141. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1959-60 (2006).
142. Id. at 1960. Under previous cases such as Givhan v. Western Line
Consoidated School District., and Connick v. Myers, the Court looked at various
factors to determine the strength of the competing parties' interests in protecting
and suppressing whatever speech was at issue. See Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415, and
Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983). Among others, such factors
include: when the speech was made, where the speech took place, how the speech
was presented, and the subject matter of the speech and the relation of the speaker
to the subject matter. Id. Justice Kennedy seems to quickly brush over any
consideration of these factors by simply asserting that they are not dispositive,
without any substantive justification for why they are not relevant to the discussion
of whether Ceballos' speech is protectable under the First Amendment.
143. Id.; see Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 833 (1995); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). Justice Souter, in his
dissenting opinion, later notes that Justice Kennedy wrongly summarizes Rust and
27-2
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According to Justice Kennedy, Ceballos spoke as a prosecutor
fulfilling a responsibility to advise his supervisor about how to best
proceed with a pending case. 14 5 Justice Kennedy contends that, in
Pickering, when the school teacher wrote a letter to a local
newspaper, it had no official significance to his job as a teacher. In
wrongly equates statements made by a public employee in the scope of
employment to be treated as government speech. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1968. In
Rust v. Sullivan, the Court held that regulations that barred recipients of Title X
funds from participating in abortion counseling, referral, and activities advocating
abortion as a method of family planning did not violate the First Amendment.
Rust, 500 U.S. at 178. The Rust court contended that the government can
selectively fund a program to encourage activities it believes are in the public
interest while choosing not to fund alternative programs without violating the
Constitution. Id. at 193. To hold the government in violation of the First
Amendment for selective funding would make numerous government programs
constitutionally suspect. Id. at 194.
144. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960. One could also argue, however, that the
memo was a matter of public concern. Certainly, there are many professions where
an employee's comments made during and related to the scope of his employment
have little to no bearing on important public issues. A soap opera writer, for
example, who chooses to air his grievances about a particular plot point, would not
be in fear of addressing a substantive public issue. Likewise, there are several
professions where an employee's opinions, because of the very nature of the work
involved, have the capacity to directly affect important public concerns. A doctor
or nurse who voices his opinion regarding potential malpractice of another on staff
can be a matter of life and death, or at the least, a matter of public health; a law
enforcement officer's evaluations of his work or workplace can easily be construed
as issues of public safety; and, like Ceballos, an attorney who writes a memo to his
supervisors about a potential misrepresentation made in the legal process can be
understood to be raising important public issues such as ethical conduct and an
honest commitment to justice.
145. Id. at 1959. Admittedly, one could imagine any number of average
citizens writing a letter to their local newspaper to criticize the impending demise
of small, local businesses and the arrival of a new Wal Mart. Conversely, it is
unlikely an average concerned citizen would contact their District Attorney's office
to alert them to a possible bad affidavit for a particular case. On the surface, such a
comparison seems to make sense-a citizen is speaking as a government employee,
about a job-related matter, is not the same as a citizen speaking as a citizen about a
general public issue. However, such a comparison seems to obfuscate the reality
that many government employees' jobs deal primarily with public concerns. For
example, a janitor for the government, who chooses to speak out about some aspect
of his job to his supervisors, is not likely expressing himself regarding matters of
public concern. In contrast, Ceballos expressed his opinion about his work, but his
work is also a matter of public concern-arguably, the accuracy of the American
criminal and judicial system.
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fact, Justice Kennedy argues, the letter was one that would have
likely been written by a normal citizen. 14 6
Next, Justice Kennedy asserts that such reduced First
Amendment protection for government employees speaking on
matters pursuant to their jobs does not unnecessarily censure them. 147
In fact, according to Justice Kennedy, government employees may
speak freely in a setting of a public debate or civic discourse. 148
Further, Justice Kennedy finds that the Garcetti holding supports past
precedent of giving government employers discretion to efficiently
and effectively manage their employees. 149 Justice Kennedy argues
that employers have heightened interests in controlling their
employees' work-related speech, as a means of ensuring
professionalism and properly reacting to potentially inflammatory
speech. 150
Because statements made by public employees may receive
reduced constitutional protections, Justice Kennedy acknowledges
the importance of "promoting the public's interest in receiving the
well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic
discussion."'' He further recognizes the fine balancing act between
146. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1959.
147. Id. at 1960. In fact, Justice Kennedy cautions that public employees'
ability to participate in public debate does not give them a right to perform their
jobs without restriction. Id.
148. Id. It seems strange that Justice Kennedy would suggest they must go to
a public forum instead of directly address the issue with those with whom they
work.
149. Id. There is certainly a difference between speech in the workplace and
speech in a public forum. I agree that employers have a need to maintain a
professional and efficient work place; however, this seems at odds with Justice
Kennedy's previous comment of how government employees are not hindered in
their ability to voice their public concerns in a public forum.
150. Id One may argue that most employees would prefer to voice their
concerns to their supervisors, and only reach out publicly or to a third party when
existing managerial infrastructure does not properly or comfortably allow
employees to communicate openly and honestly with their supervisors. Thus, if an
employer does as he feels and acts in response to a heightened interest in
maintaining office decorum, theoretically an employee would not feel the need to
speak out publicly.
151. Id. at 1958. Here, Justice Kennedy seems to briefly touch upon the point
that public employees' duties are often, by their very nature, related to important
public issues. Further exploring that line of thinking, any fear of retaliatory
promoting individual and societal interests in having employees
speak as citizens and needs of government employers to perform
their important public functions. 
52
Thus, Justice Kennedy believes that, when public employees
make statements pursuant to their official duties, they are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes; the Constitution
does not protect their communications from employer discipline.153
Justice Kennedy distinguishes Garcetti from Pickering, stating that,
in Pickering, the letter written by a school teacher to a newspaper has
no official significance to the teacher's job and would be the same as
letter submitted by average Joe Shmoe.15
4
Instead, Justice Kennedy finds Garcetti's holding to be consistent
with past precedent's emphasis on giving government employers
adequate discretion to properly manage their workplaces.'
55
According to Justice Kennedy, Garcetti's proposed contrary rule
would compel state and federal courts to engage in the permanent
and intrusive task of overseeing communications between and among
government employees and their superiors in the course of official
business.156  While Justice Kennedy acknowledges that the First
Amendment requires a delicate balancing when an employee speaks
as a citizen, he sees no need for the same degree of scrutiny for an
employee who is simply performing his job duties. 157 According to
Justice Kennedy, applying a Pickering balancing analysis to an
employee speaking out about a work-related issue would result in a
discharge would seem to significantly hinder a government employee's desire, or
duty even, to honestly assess his job and anything related to it.
152. Id. at 1959. While Justice Kennedy acknowledges the utility of the
Pickering balancing test, he fails to explain why it does not apply to Ceballos.
153. Id. at 1960.
154. Id. The Pickering court stated that the teacher's letter did not impede his
performance of his daily duties as a teacher. Pickering v. Bd. Of Educ., 391 U.S.
563, 572-73 (1968). However, it also acknowledged that the teacher was critical of
the school board, the teacher's ultimate employer. Id. at 572. Further, teachers
were deemed a class of community members likely to have informed opinions on
how school funds should be spent. Id.
155. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960. By denying Ceballos First Amendment
protection, Garcetti indeed reinforces a government employer's ability to respond
to such speech using retaliatory tactics.
156. Id. at 1961.
157. Id.
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permanent judicial intervention in the basic, everyday functions of
government operations. 158
In reversing and remanding the Ninth Circuit's decision, Justice
Kennedy asserts that the Ninth Circuit's decision was both
impractical and based on a limited doctrinal anomaly of relating only
to expressions an employee makes during the course of official job-
related duties, not to statements made as a citizen and outside the
scope of his job. 159 Further, Justice Kennedy believes that the Ninth
Circuit's holding misperceives the theoretical foundation of Garcetti:
when an employee makes a public statement outside the scope of
their job, he retains First Amendment protection for such expression
because it is the type of activity a non-government employee would
make. 6 0
Justice Kennedy also asserts that the Ninth Circuit's decision is
impractical because it would result in state and federal courts
permanently and intrusively overseeing work-related
communications between government employees and employers.'
6 1
Justice Kennedy argues that, if a public employer wants to encourage
its employees to voice their concerns privately, within the company
and not to a third party, it may institute its own internal set of policies
and protocol. 162  By doing so, the employer discourages its
employees from preferring to voice their concerns in public. 163
According to Justice Kennedy, the First Amendment does not
disallow managerial discipline made in response to an employee's
158. Id.
159. Id
160. Id.
161. Id
162. Id. Justice Kennedy's push for employers to strategize when
implementing internal communication policies seems effective. When employees
feel comfortable in their workplace, and feel free to communicate to their
supervisors and fellow co-workers their grievances and related issues in an
environment safe from unwarranted retaliatory action, they will likely do so and
avoid resorting to airing their complaints in a public setting, reaching out to a third
party, or otherwise bypassing their supervisors in the process.
163. Id. Justice Kennedy is vague when it comes to explaining how this will
happen. An employee may be discouraged from voicing his job-related concerns
internally instead of in a public forum if an employer's internal communication
policies are highly regimented, regulated, and prohibitive.
job-related expressions. 164  Hence, because Ceballos' memo was
made pursuant to his official responsibilities, Ceballos' claim of
retaliatory actions by Garcetti fail.165
Finally, Justice Kennedy raises two points.' 66  First, he
emphasizes that there is no dispute Ceballos wrote his memo as part
of his job duties.' 67  Justice Kennedy rejects the suggestion that
employers will be able to restrict employees' rights by creating
excessively broad job descriptions. 68 According to Justice Kennedy,
a job description usually does not accurately describe the job's actual
duties.169 Thus, listing a given task is neither necessary nor sufficient
to show that a particular task is within the scope of one's official job
duties for First Amendment purposes. 70
164. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1961(2006).
165. Id. Here, Justice Kennedy seems to skip a step in his analysis and equate
the fact the memo was made pursuant to official responsibilities with diminished
First Amendment protection without exploring why speech made pursuant to one's
job deserves it. Instead, Justice Kennedy's justification seems limited to the need
for increased managerial control over employer-employee communications and the
fact Ceballos' memo was made pursuant to official job responsibilities, which
almost seems circular.
166. Id
167. Id
168. Id. Justice Kennedy's dismissal of an employer being able to effectively
chill an employee's freedom of expression by creating a broad job description,
theoretically making anything the employee speaks of something that is pursuant to
an official job duty, seems superficial and unfounded. If a job description does not
accurately depict an employee's job duties, it would logically follow that perhaps a
reasonable person's understanding of one's job or the collective impressions of
both a supervisor and employee would suffice in establishing an employee's job
duties. Yet, this reasoning creates a sort of vague hodge-podge of what an
employee's duties are. The very fact that determining what exactly an employee's
specific job duties are so that a court can then determine if speech was made
pursuant to a job duty is one-dimensional and completely ignores all of the other
factors involved in determining if speech is of a public concern, such as what, how,
and when a statement is made.
169. Id. at 1962.
170. Id. Ostensibly, because an employee's job duties often defy established
definition, it would be difficult for an employer to censure its employees by
holding them to such inflexible measures. However, it is because of this sort of
loose and indeterminate method of establishing what exactly an employee's job
duties are, and consequently what speech is made pursuant to an employee's job
duties, that seems to cut against Justice Kennedy's argument for finding that a
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Second, while Garcetti may have a significant impact on speech
related to scholarship or teaching, the Court does not address it in the
opinion. Although Justice Kennedy acknowledges the importance of
exposing governmental inefficiency and misconduct, he rejects the
notion that the First Amendment "shields from discipline the
expressions employees make pursuant to their professional duties."''
B. Dissenting Opinion: Justice Stevens
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens dismisses Justice
Kennedy's conclusion as overly broad and contends that the majority
should have used the Pickering balancing approach. 72 To begin,
Justice Stevens agrees with Justice Kennedy that the issue
surrounding Garcetti is whether the First Amendment protects a
government employee from discipline based on speech made
pursuant to the employee's official duties.1 73 Yet, unlike Justice
Kennedy, Justice Stevens believes that a government employee can
sometimes speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern. 17
4
Justice Stevens agrees with Justice Souter that, "public
employees are still citizens while they are in the office."' 75 Further,
according to Justice Stevens, the notion of a categorical difference
between speaking as a citizen or during course of employment is
government employee speaking on a matter pursuant to his job duties is not
speaking as a concerned citizen. Often times, one's job duties are intertwined with
what citizens deem to be important public concerns. When a doctor speaks out
about a lack of funding at his local hospital, he is not only speaking as an employee
of the hospital pursuant to his duty as an employee, but also as a concerned citizen
speaking out about health care issues that affect numerous citizens.
171. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1962 (2006).
172. Id. at 1962-63.
173. Id. at 1962.
174. Id. In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy implies that Ceballos did
not speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern. Id. at 1960. Justice Stevens
acknowledges that a supervisor may take necessary action when speech is
"inflammatory or misguided." Id. at 1962. Similarly, in Hosford, a disobedient
and disrespectful employee was fired and the California Court of Appeal found that
the employee's First Amendment rights were not violated. Hosford v. State Pers.
Bd., 74 Cal. App. 3d 302 (1977).
175. Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1963. Here, Justice Stevens and Justice Souter
attack the crux of Justice Kennedy's argument, which appears to convey the
message that public employees cannot speak as citizens.
wrong. 7 6 According to Justice Stevens, it seems contrary to make a
new rule that gives employees an incentive to voice their concerns in
public before talking frankly with employers. 177
C. Dissenting Opinion: Justice Souter with
Justices Stevens and Ginsbergjoining.
In his Dissenting Opinion, Justice Souter takes a broad and
practical look at the vast spectrum of situations that exist within the
realm of employee speech. 78 Like Justice Stevens, Justice Souter
believes that the majority should have used a Pickering-type
balancing approach in Garcetti.179 However, Justice Souter does so
with certain qualifications.' 80 He acknowledges and agrees with the
majority that a government employer may have substantial interests
in achieving its own policies and objectives by requiring competency
and honesty from its employees.'81
Justice Souter asserts, however, that both private and public
interests in addressing wrongdoing in the workplace can outweigh
such a governmental interest. 182 In support of his assertion, Justice
Souter outlines the wide variety of potential speech issues.' 83 At one
end of the spectrum, Justice Souter places open speech by a private
176. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1963 (2006). Justice Souter
astutely recognizes that Justice Kennedy makes an unparallel comparison. Instead,
the Court should look at whether a person spoke as a citizen on a matter of public
concern and whether a person spoke pursuant to his duties as an employee as
separate factors to consider.
177. Id. Justice Stevens is right to suggest that the Garcetti holding will
encourage employees to air their grievances or other work-related concerns
elsewhere for fear of retaliatory employment action.
178. Id
179. Id
180. Id. at 1963-68.
181. Id. at 1963.
182. Id. Unlike Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter does not make the illogical
leap from attempting to protect a government employer's managerial concerns of
decorum to stripping away an employee's First Amendment right to speak out.
Instead, Justice Kennedy acknowledges the legitimate concern, but balances it with
a consideration of other factors.
183. Id
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citizen on public matter.184 Such speech, according to Justice Souter,
is the heart of expression subject to First Amendment protection.' 85
At the other end of the spectrum, Justice Souter places statements
made by a government employee complaining about nothing more
than treatment under personnel rules. 186 Such speech, according to
Justice Souter, is no greater of a claim to First Amendment protection
against retaliatory response than the remarks of a private
employee. 87 In the middle of the spectrum is "public employee's
speech unwelcome to the government but on a significant public
issue." 188
According to Justice Souter, a speaker's interest in commenting
on a public concern is not ignored just because the government
employs him.' 89 Justice Souter contends that the reason employee
speech is not wholly protected by the First Amendment is because it
can be distracting and make a workplace less productive, particularly
if an employee is griping about his work.' 90 Instead, Justice Souter
believes, as is the case in Garcetti, that the Pickering balancing test is
the proper approach to take when an employee speaks critically about
his own employer's administration.191
Justice Souter compares Garcetti to two cases following
Pickering: Givhan and Madison.192 In Givhan, a school teacher who
complained to a superior about potentially discriminatory hiring
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1964.
187. Id.; see Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
188. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1964. Like Justice Stevens, Justice Souter raises
the issue of employee speech that is made both pursuant to official duties and
concerning public issues.
189. Id. However, under Garcetti, Ceballos' comment on an arguably public
concern of a faulty search warrant is unprotected by the First Amendment.
190. Id.
191. Id. In deferring to Pickering, Justice Souter acknowledges the First
Amendment's purpose of protecting an individual's right to freedom of speech.
Without a proper balancing of often competing interests, and by bypassing
Pickering, the Garcetti majority takes away an individual's interest in his own
speech before it can even be protected.
192. Id.; see Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
practices was protected from being fired. 193 In Madison, a school
teacher spoke out, in a public meeting, to a school board about
pending teachers' union negotiations.' 94 In both cases the Court held
each school teacher to be speaking as citizens, with the Madison
Court emphasizing that its school teacher spoke as both a citizen and
an employee, simultaneously. 195
Justice Souter asserts that the Court in both Givhan and Madison
acknowledge that a citizen can speak on subjects closely tied to his
own job. 196  However, according to Justice Souter, Garcetti and
Givhan, when viewed together, create a strange distinction where a
school teacher would be protected from complaining about hiring
policies, but a school personnel officer would not be.197
Instead, Justice Souter argues that the need for a Pickering-type
balancing approach does not disappear when an employee speaks on
matters pursuant to his job duties. According to Justice Souter, both
the public and individual's interest in such speech may be even
higher when an employee's speech is made pursuant to his duties
because his job requires him to have intimate knowledge of the
subject.'98 To that end, Justice Souter argues that a citizen, such as
Ceballos, who chooses to make public issues the subject of his work
would likely prize his right to speak on such issues. 99 Further,
193. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1964.
194. Id.; see Madison, 429 U.S. 167.
195. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1964. See Givhan, 439 U.S. 410; Madison, 429
U.S. 177. It is unclear from Justice Souter's opinion whether or not he views
Ceballos as having spoken out as a citizen, an employee, or both, as was the case in
Madison.
196. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1964.
197. Id. at 1965. Justice Souter feels the distinction made in Garcetti-that of
denying Pickering protection to speech made pursuant to official duties -requires
justification, which the Court has yet to give.
198. Id. Justice Souter's distinction between those who speak out on issues of
public concern that have experience with the issue (such as employees, as is the
case here) and average citizens is perceptive and exemplifies the Ninth Circuit's
need to employ Pickering on remand. As Justice Souter suggests, the more
knowledgeable a speaker is on a topic related to an employer, the more potential
there is for the speech to disrupt the workplace.
199. Id. at 1965-66. Here, Justice Souter attacks the heart of the majority
opinion in Garcetti. Not only is it possible for a public employee to speak out on a
topic related to his work duties that is also a public concern, but the reason why it is
so likely there will be an overlap between what is pursuant to an employee's work
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Justice Souter notes that the Pickering Court recognized a public
interest in hearing the speech of informed employees. 200
Justice Souter concedes that the majority was right to find that a
government employer has heightened concerns regarding employee
speech.201 An employee who speaks out pursuant to his job duties
has "greater leverage to create office uproars and fracture the
government's authority to set policy to be carried out coherently
through the ranks. 20 2  Yet, beyond such shared concerns, Justice
Souter strays from the majority in Garcetti, arguing that a categorical
exclusion of First Amendment protection against retaliatory action by
bypassing Pickering is unnecessary.20 3
In support of using Pickering and with respect to the associated
risks of a government employee speech in his workplace, Justice
Souter contends that an employee's speech made pursuant to his job
duties should not prevail unless it is of a matter of unusual
importance and satisfies high standards of responsibility in the way
the speech was brought forth.204
In fact, according to Justice Souter, only speech addressing
official dishonesty and threats to health and safety can help an
employee overcome the balancing of interests. 20 5 Further, Justice
and what is a public concern is that a public employee's work is likely to revolve
around public concerns.
200. Id. at 1966. As Justice Souter touched upon earlier, public employees are
often in a superior position of being knowledgeable about the topics about which
they speak. Justice Souter notes that when a public auditor speaks out on
discovering embezzlement of public funds, it weighs as much in the public's
interest as in his own duty as a public employee to share such information. Id. at
1966-67.
201. Id. at 1967.
202. Id
203. Id. By employing a Pickering balancing test, Justice Souter respects the
interests of both the government employer and the individual employee.
204. Id. A presumption in favor of the government employee appears to be
Justice Souter's solution to placating the majority's fear that a Pickering balancing
approach would disregard the government's legitimate concerns of maintaining
office decorum and achieving its prescribed policy goals.
205. Id Justice Souter also includes deliberately unconstitutional behavior
and other serious wrongdoings as causes to tip the balance in the government
employee's favor. Id. Such standards for being able to overcome Justice Souter's
presumption in favor of a government employee seem extreme. However, it is in
line with Giacalone's finding that an employee's speech on a work issue was
Souter contends that the majority's position does not guarantee
against an influx in litigation regarding whether an employee's
speech was made pursuant to his official duties. 20 6 Justice Souter
claims that recent history shows the circuit courts have not seen an
overwhelming flood of retaliatory discharge claims.2 °7
In sum, Justice Souter charges the Garcetti majority with
accepting two erroneous beliefs. First, that a government employee's
speech made pursuant to his official duties is in fact the
government's own speech.2 °8  Second, that First Amendment
protection need not apply in Garcetti because existing whistle-blower
statutes have, and will, protect government employees such as
Ceballos.20 9
Justice Souter argues that statutory protection for government
employees speaking out varies widely depending on their particular
jurisdictions. 210  To show the insufficiency of relying on existing
statutory protection alone, Justice Souter contends that the school
teacher in Givhan, for example, would not have qualified as a
whistle-blower, who exposes an official's wrongdoing to a third party
or to the public.211
On remand, Justice Souter suggests that the Ninth Circuit take
into account several facts the majority fails to mention, including: the
fact that after showing Sundstedt, his supervisor, his memo, Ceballos
complied with Sundstedt's plan to soften the accusatory rhetoric to
make it less incendiary; and the fact that after meeting with his
sufficiently disruptive to his workplace to deny him First Amendment protection.
Giacalone v. Abrams, 850 F.2d. 79 (1988).
206. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1967-68 (2006).
207 Id. at 1968.
208 Id. Justice Souter argues that Ceballos was "paid to enforce the law by
constitutional action: to exercise the county government's prosecutorial power by
acting honestly, competently, and constitutionally." Id. at 1969. In Rust v.
Sullivan, when the government uses public funds to promote a particular policy, it
is entitled to say what it wishes. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). However,
Justice Souter believes that the Majority wrongly relied on the interpretation of
Rust in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia., 515 U.S. 819
(1995), which equates statements made by a public employee in the scope of
employment to be treated as government speech.
209. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1968-69.
210. Id. at 1971.
211. Id. at 1970.
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department, Ceballos told Najera, his immediate supervisor, he felt
obliged to give the defense his memo as exculpatory evidence, but
when she ordered him to write a new memo with only the sheriffs
statements, he instead turned over the existing memo with his own
conclusions redacted.21 2
Further, Justice Souter suggests that the Ninth Circuit use a
Pickering analysis in assessing all of Ceballos' statements, not only
the memo he submitted to his superiors.213  In support of his
conclusion, Justice Souter raises several facts which were overlooked
in the Ninth Circuit's analysis.214 Ceballos' section 1983 claim was
for the alleged retaliatory actions his supervisors took in response to
submitting his memo and discussing the subject with Najera and
Sunstedt, testifying truthfully about the subject at the hearing, and
speaking about the subject at a Mexican-American Bar Association
event.21 5 Justice Souter notes that not all of Ceballos' statements
were made pursuant to official duties, and a court would surely have
to analyze Ceballos' testimony separately to preserve the integrity of
the judicial process.216
D. Dissenting Opinion: Justice Breyer
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer disagrees with both the
Majority and Justice Souter's dissenting opinions.217 Parting with the
Majority, Justice Breyer contends that the Pickering balancing test
should have been used in Garcetti.1 8 However, unlike Justice
Souter, Justice Breyer believes that the Pickering balancing test
should not be applied freely and indiscriminately in all cases
212 Garcetti, at 1971-72. Justice Souter also emphasizes the fact that
Ceballos sought his position as a deputy district attorney out of a personal
commitment to civil service. Id. at 1971. This fact supports Justice Souter's
argument that a citizen, such as Ceballos, who chooses to make such public issues
the subject of his work would likely place a high value on his right to speak on
such issues. Id. at 1965-66.
213. Id. at 1972-73.
214. Id. at 1973.
215. Id
216. Id
217. Id
218. Id
regarding employee speech made pursuant to official duties.21 9 To
begin, Justice Breyer addresses and establishes what all members of
the Court agree on in Garcetti.22 °
First, Justice Breyer states that the First Amendment cannot offer
all speech the same degree of protection.22 ' Second, he contends that
where speech of government employees is at issue, the First
Amendment offers protection "only where the offer of protection
itself will not unduly interfere with legitimate governmental interests,
such as the interest in efficient administration. '" 222  Third, Justice
Breyer contends that "where a government employee speaks as an
employee upon matters only of personal interest, the First
Amendment does not offer protection. "223
Next, Justice Breyer asserts that the majority should have applied
the Pickering standard for several reasons, largely because the speech
at issue in Garcetti is professional speech (from a lawyer) which
deserves special Constitutional protection. 224 To that end, according
to Justice Breyer, the Constitution imposes speech obligations on
professional government employees, stating: "Where professional
and special constitutional obligations are both present, the need to
protect the employee's speech is augmented, the need for broad
government authority to control that speech is likely diminished, and
administrable standards are quite likely available." 
225
Justice Breyer claims that he understands the majority's concern
that there is a need to give government employers sufficient
discretion to manage their operations.226 However, he also contends
219. Id. at 1971-73.
220. Id
221. Id
222. Id
223. Id.; see Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 157 (1983). "Where the
employee speaks 'as a citizen...upon matters of public concern,' the First
Amendment offers protection but only where the speech survives a screening test."
See also Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Prior cases do not
decide what screening test a judge should apply in circumstances such as Ceballos'
situation. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1974.
224. Id
225. Id
226. Id.
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that there is also a need, under certain circumstances, to protect
speech.227
Justice Breyer then critiques Justice Souter's dissenting opinion,
asserting that Justice Souter's conclusion falls short of adequately
addressing the managerial and administrative concerns government
employers have with employee speech.228 Instead, Justice Breyer
asserts that Justice Souter's proposal would require the Court to
apply the Pickering balancing test to all cases of government
employee speech, which would be too inclusive.229 Justice Breyer
argues that such broad application of Pickering is at odds with Justice
Souter's assumption that the government should prevail in such
balancing unless the employee speaks on a matter of unusual
importance or serious wrongdoing. 230
For example, Justice Breyer notes that police officers,
firefighters, and building inspectors are among the numerous public
employees who speak about issues of public health, safety, and
integrity. 23' According to Justice Breyer, a substantial amount of
public employee speech deals with such wrongdoing, safety, and
honesty.
232
In Justice Breyer's estimation, Justice Souter's overly inclusive
use of Pickering does not avoid the need to undertake a balancing,
and instead interferes and substantially overlaps with existing
statutory protections such as whistle-blower statutes. 233  Justice
Breyer contends that the overuse of Pickering and judicial activity,
227. Id
228. Id. at 1975.
229. Id. According to Justice Breyer, Justice Souter's assessment of Garcetti
includes too many issues of public concern, whereby the screening test would not
screen out very much. Id. Justice Breyer asserts that the main problem is that the
standard does not avoid the judicial need to undertake the balance in the first place.
Id. at 1976. Also, the list of categories substantially overlaps areas where there are
already whistle-blower statutes that cover these issues. Id.
230. Id. at 1975. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Souter contends that, in a
Pickering balancing test, the risks to the government are great enough that
employees should not prevail on the balancing test unless the employee spoke on a
matter of unique importance and satisfied high standards of responsibility in the
way he spoke. Id. at 1967.
231. Id. at 1975.
232. Id
233. Id. at 1975-76.
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such as filing a complaint or engaging in discovery, would unduly
interfere with a government employer's managerial capacity and
efficacy. 23
4
Unlike the majority, Justice Breyer argues that a First
Amendment cause of action can apply to government employee
speech that takes place pursuant to official duties and which involves
a matter of public concern. 235 Nevertheless, unlike Justice Souter,
Justice Breyer argues judicial action only applies when there is a
demonstrated need for constitutional protection and a decreased risk
of undue interference with managerial concerns and goals. 236 On
balance, Justice Breyer concludes a Pickering balancing test should
have been applied since the circumstances in Garcetti meet both
prerequisites. 2
37
V. IMPACT & SIGNIFICANCE
A. Legal Impact
Because the case law regarding First Amendment protection for
government employee speech is already expansive and continues to
grow, the legal impact of Garcetti is significant because it establishes
a clear and previously uncharted exception where the Court finds
employee speech to have diminished protection under the
Constitution.238 Under Garcetti, when a public employee speaks out
on a matter pursuant to his official duty, his speech is not protected
under the First Amendment.239
In particular, Garcetti raises the issue of when the Pickering
balancing test should be applied in cases of public employee
speech.24 ° Under the Pickering balancing test, the Court must
balance between the teacher's interests, as a citizen, in commenting
on matters of public concern and the state's interests, as an employer
234. Id. at 1975.
235. Id. at 1976.
236. Id.
237. Id
238. Id. at 1960, 1962.
239. Id. at 1962.
240. Id. at 1957.
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in efficiently performing its public services. 241  Thus, under
Pickering, a court must first determine whether the employee spoke
as a citizen on a matter of public concern, and second, whether or not
there is a pptential First Amendment claim. 242
In Garcetti, Justice Kennedy established that the Pickering
balancing test did not apply to Ceballos, a deputy district attorney
voicing his concerns about his work.24 3 As a result, the Court held
that government employees who speak pursuant to their official
responsibilities cannot speak as citizens on matters of public
concern.
244
Whether Garcetti correctly addressed Pickering's applicability to
government employee speech made pursuant to official job
responsibilities is debatable. 245 Under previous cases such as Givhan
v. Western Line Consolidated School Dist., and Connick v. Myers, the
Court looked at various factors to determine the strength of the
competing parties' interests in protecting or suppressing whatever
speech is at issue.246 Some factors included: when the speech was
made; where the speech took place; how the speech was presented;
the subject matter of the speech; and the relation of the speaker to the
subject matter.247 However, Garcetti established that such factors are
not dispositive when a government employee speaks out on matters
pursuant to official work-related duties.248
Arguably, as suggested in Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion,
Garcetti misinterprets protections offered by federal and state
whistle-blower statutes. 249 As such, federal and state lawmakers
241. Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). According to the
Pickering Court, the threat of dismissal from public employment is an effective
means of inhibiting speech. Id. at 574.
242. Id. According to Pickering, teachers were deemed a class of community
members likely to have informed opinions on how school funds should be spent.
Id. at 572.
243. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1962-76.
246. See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415 (1979);
Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983).
247. Id
248. Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1959-60.
249. Id. at 1976.
would be wise to evaluate current statutory protections. Similarly,
the Court should explore the various factual circumstances when
denying First Amendment protection to a government employee who
spoke out concerning a job-related matter, would leave the employee
without any viable or reasonable courses of action to respond to
alleged retaliatory employment actions.
If there are numerous circumstances that would leave a
government employee unprotected and without a means of recourse,
the Court would benefit from reconsidering if a Pickering balancing
analysis should even be used in such situations, and perhaps carve
out specific exceptions to Garcetti. Perhaps subsequent Court
decisions could address specific factual circumstances in which a
government employee who speaks out pursuant to his employment
duties is deemed to be speaking as a citizen on a matter of public
concern.
If the Court still finds that Pickering should not apply in such
situations, it should then ask whether the Court's interests in
preserving and promoting an efficient government is met by denying
First Amendment protection to such speech. Otherwise, the Court
may want to consider if an alternative balancing analysis would be
less offensive and more palatable than a Pickering balancing.
As suggested by Justice Souter's dissenting opinion, Garcetti
suggests a need to clarify the categorical distinctions between
government employees and non-government employees, and the
possible categorical distinctions among the type of employee duties
involved. 25" As it stands, Garcetti creates a broad categorical
distinction between public and non-public employees. 251 Whether
the distinction is proper or agreed upon is up for debate; however, the
relevance to future government employee cases is undisputed.
B. Societal Impact
By and large, Garcetti and its predecessors provide an ever
changing and increasingly complex precedent. First and foremost,
Garcetti will primarily impact government personnel, including both
employers and employees, in all fields. Beyond government
250. Id. at 1963.
251. Id. at 1962.
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workers, Garcetti may impact lawmakers, the judiciary, and society
at large.
Generally speaking, from a government employee's perspective,
Garcetti stands as a warning call to carefully contemplate the
necessity of expressing any work-related concerns for fear of
retaliatory discharge. From Garcetti, one may argue that a
government employee, or any employee for that matter, is less likely
to attempt to express himself and address any grievances or work-
related criticisms directly to his superiors for fear of retaliatory
employment practices.
Arguably, Garcetti creates little incentive for a government
employee to choose to express their concerns internally.25 2
Government employee may find that voicing their concerns directly
to a supervisor may result in retaliatory actions, and instead may
prefer to consult with and voice their concerns to an outside party in
a public forum. Government employees may also seek to bypass
direct supervisors with whom communications may be sensitive and
target top management instead.
According to Justice Kennedy's reasoning, a public employee
who speaks on matters of public concerns cannot do so as a
concerned citizen.25 3 Thus, a government employee might conclude
that his role as an employee, despite working on matters of public
concern, is distinctly separate from his role as a private citizen.
Under Garcetti, a public employee might surmise he would have
to hope and pray his supervisors are not offended, threatened, or
merely annoyed by any suggestions he may have to make in regards
to a particular office matter. Because, if his supervisors are
threatened, annoyed, or simply tired of the public employee's
comments and suggestions, or are frustrated by the related notion of
having a troublesome or irritating employee, such employers can
respond in kind and the employee will have little recourse or means
to protect himself.
If, in response to the government employee's expression of his
concerns, a government employer demotes, transfers, or even
discharges the employee, the employee would have little choice but
to believe that voicing his concerns was the cause of such action.
252. Id. at 1960.
253. Id. at 1958.
Such situations would likely impact the interoffice dynamic in a
government workplace.
In Garcetti, a significant emphasis was placed on the importance
of government employers establishing and maintaining internal office
communication infrastructure and standards. 254 However, the scale
of what is proper office protocol and atmosphere varies, and depends
very much on the particular office itself. In some areas of work, a
high level of structure and chain of command is necessary. In other
areas of work, workers who are self-reliant and work independently
may be valued. Garcetti appears to discount such differences in
public workplaces.
Instead of potentially abusing their latent ability to dictate
interoffice communications, hopefully government employers will
look at Garcetti as a wakeup call. Garcetti can be used as an
opportunity to reassess whether the policies already in place foster an
environment where employees feel free and unthreatened to voice
their opinions in the hopes of making the workplace better.
To that end, if government employers, in taking stock of their
own office practices, see room for improvement (certainly, there is
always room for improvement), they will hopefully take the
opportunity to clean up their existing office protocol and further, the
government employers should take preemptive measures to avoid
situations similar to Garcetti.
Beyond Garcetti's effect on government employers and
employees, Garcetti may affect policy makers as well.255 As Justice
Breyer discussed in his dissenting opinion in Garcetti, the majority
misinterpreted the current landscape of federal and state whistle-
blower statutes. 256 Policy makers at all levels may use Garcetti as a
spring board from which to examine existing protections and now
their efficacy in light of Garcetti.
According to the majority in Garcetti, by denying First
Amendment protection to government employees who speak on
issues pursuant to their job duties, the Court will avoid the
burdensome and intrusive judicial oversight that such a holding
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1976.
256. Id.
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would have required.257 By concluding that a public employee who
speaks pursuant to his job duties is not subject to First Amendment
protection, Garcetti streamlines the categorization of public
employees in assessing that protection. However, Garcetti does so at
the expense of potentially leaving some public employees without a
means of defending themselves.
Meanwhile, Garcetti's effect on retaliatory discharge related
lawsuits is questionable. As Justice Souter contends, Garcetti does
not guarantee against a flood in litigation regarding whether an
employee's speech was made pursuant to his official duties. 8 In
fact, according to Justice Souter, recent history shows the circuit
courts have not seen an overwhelming flood of retaliatory discharge
claims.25
9
There is a popular notion that government work, and often those
who seek its employment, strive to promote and effectuate the higher
goals of the government, including protecting and encouraging public
service.260  However, the outcome of Garcetti seems to undermine
this largely accepted notion, and suggests that while government
workers goals may be in line with issues of public concern, such
workers fall into a broad exception thereby denying them full First
Amendment protection.
The initial impact on government employers may be positive
through the chilling of government employee speech related to work
and by reducing litigation in connection with alleged retaliatory
discharge and other employment actions. However, the holding in
Garcetti seems to engender an internal tension among government
employers and employees, and the ways in which they communicate
and interact with each other in their efforts to achieve their larger
work-related goals. The long-term effect of Garcetti may result in
government employees cultivating an increasing mistrust of their
supervisors and the bureaucratic system which fundamentally lacks
the confidence in and respect for its employees to protect their
speech.
257. Id. at 1961.
258. Id. at 1967-68.
259. Id. at 1968.
260. Idat 1965-66.
VI. CONCLUSION
In denying First Amendment protection for employee speech
made pursuant to official job-related concerns, Garcetti sends a clear
message to government employees: in the Court's eyes there is no
distinction between statements made pursuant to official duties about
matters of public concern and those that are not matters of public
concern.
26 1
When Ceballos spoke out on a matter of public concern, the
Court concluded he spoke as a public employee pursuant to his job
duties, and not as a citizen voicing his concerns. 262 As such, the
Court did not balance Ceballos' interests with that of his employer.
Nor did the Garcetti Court give much thought to the context or
content of Ceballos' speech. Whether such a distinction is warranted
and vindicated is debatable as the impact on the legal community and
society at large remains unseen.
261. See generally Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. 1951.
262. Id. at 1960-61.
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